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disclosed donations.  Current reform proposals will reduce but not eliminate this potential, 
especially if there is no enumeration of commercial payments and loans received by politicians 
and parties. 
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 1 
Introduction 
A stimulating combination of theory and anecdote has dominated corruption studies 
in Ireland (Byrne, 2007; Collins and O’Shea, 2000; Murphy, 2000).  This article aims 
to open up a new perspective on many of the same issues, by taking a different 
theoretical and methodological approach.  Theoretically, it looks to the comparative 
literature on business funding of politics.  Hitherto, studies of Irish business and 
politics have tended to emphasise social partnership (Hardiman, 1998), industrial 
policy (Ó’Riain, 2000), corruption, or regulation (Murphy, Hogan, and Chari, 2011).  
Instead of highlighting the legal or moral status of behaviour, this article analyses the 
costs and benefits of possible exchanges and the source, timing, and recipient of 
reported donations.  In doing so, it can draw some rough inferences about the 
intention behind payments to Irish politicians and parties.  Like their counterparts 
elsewhere, Irish corruption studies tend to select on a very partially observed 
dependent variable.  Again like corruption research more generally, Irish corruption 
studies often conceptualize independent variables at the systemic level, and therefore 
country case studies can also suffer from a lack of variation in their independent 
variables.  Studying business donations to politics encounters many of the same 
problems, but in a less severe form.  In particular, it is possible to look at TDs who 
did not receive donations and TDs in and out of governing parties and the cabinet.  
This is the basic way in which the different intentions behind reported payments can 
be inferred.  Thus, this article hopes to provide a useful complement to existing 
studies of business and politics in Ireland.   
 
The article begins by introducing the theoretical language of motivation and exchange 
that underpins the analysis.  Next is an analysis of the costs and benefits of different 
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types of exchange between Irish businesses and politicians.  It is followed by a 
consideration of disclosed and undisclosed donations, concentrating on a quantitative 
analysis of donations reported by TDs.  The penultimate section applies the theory 
and evidence of this article to reforms proposed by the Moriarty Tribunal and the 
current government.  The conclusion summarises the article’s contribution to the 
literature on Irish politics and its implications for Irish public policy. 
 
 
Motivations and Exchanges 
Business contributions to political parties can be conceived in terms of two general 
motivations: ideological and pragmatic.  Ideological contributions are intended to 
support a particular political vision.  Usually, the donor and donee will share political 
values, but the donor may wish to use her money to nudge the donee in a certain 
direction.  Ideological contributions are not likely to survive a cost-benefit analysis 
because, whatever the possible benefits, it is rational to free ride on the contributions 
of other businesses to the long-term class-wide interest (Olson, 1971). Ideological 
contributions are made regardless of whether any specific benefits will accrue to the 
contributing firm.  By contrast, pragmatic contributions are essentially business 
decisions, taken with the firm’s usual profit-seeking motive. The distribution of 
pragmatic donations should follow short-term changes in the power and popularity of 
parties.    
 
In many countries, pragmatic donations to parties occur in the context of low 
corruption.  In this situation, discrete exchanges such as the purchase of policy, or 
even the purchase of access to decision-makers, incur too high a reputational cost on 
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politicians.  Instead, donations form part of a reciprocal exchange.  A discrete 
exchange is explicit and simultaneous.  By contrast, in a reciprocal exchange, each 
actor’s part of the exchange is separately performed and the terms are unstated and 
uncertain (Molm, 2000: 261-2).  They help to develop and maintain a relationship 
with politicians, which may, in due course, produce a small but real increase in the 
probability of successful lobbying (Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller 1998; Gordon 
2005).   
 
These two forms of pragmatism should be associated with different strategies.  A firm 
that moves its money from right to left, as power shifts from right to left, is seeking a 
discrete exchange.  A pragmatic firm that funds parties, whether or not they are in 
government, is betting on a reciprocal exchange.  A party that values a steady income 
stream, and that values income when it is most needed, has good reason to 
reciprocate.  Moreover, discrete exchanges should be associated with larger payments 
than reciprocal exchanges.  Reciprocal exchanges have lower potential publicity costs.  
Since they are not simultaneous the payment and the policy benefit are less likely to 
be associated with each other by those outside the exchange.  Even if they are, the 
absence of simultaneity makes for plausible deniability.  Also, the value of 
contributions associated with reciprocal exchange is an accumulation of past and 
expected future payments.  Finally, payments received in opposition have a greater 
value, euro for euro, than payments received while in government.   
 
Social factors also play an important part in business financing of political parties 
(Bond 2007).  However, this can be seen as a mechanism of ideological or pragmatic 
giving.  Reciprocal donations aim to generate a sense of mutual obligation between 
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firms and politicians.  Ideally, donations provide the opportunity for business 
representatives to meet decision-makers and their brokers.  The social occasions 
serves an economic purpose – the development of a political network for the firm.  
Networks are also important in understanding ideological donations, but in this case 
the network precedes the donation.  Many people are socialised into a close 
relationship with a particular party.  In the Irish context, it is common to hear, for 
example, of a “Fianna Fáil family”. 
 
Businesses and businesspeople are likely to be differently motivated in making 
financial contributions to political parties (Burris, 2001).  Individuals are more likely 
to make ideological contributions.  In contrast to firms, they do not have to justify 
their decision to shareholders. Individuals can use cash generated by business 
activities to further their political values as opposed to their business interests. Of 
course, rich individuals are also interested in getting richer and may also be motivated 
pragmatically. Individuals are particularly likely to be influenced by social position. It 
is they who actually grew up in certain families, went to certain schools, frequent 
certain clubs and sit on certain boards. 
 
Political economies vary in the extent to which they impose costs and generate 
benefits for different types of political exchanges.  The next section reviews the 
potential costs and benefits of business funding of politics in Ireland.  Countries also 
vary in the extent, and way, in which they offer an ideological choice.  This will be 
briefly considered in the next section too. 
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Costs and Benefits of Business Financing of Politics in Ireland 
Ireland is a famous exception to the clear left-right structuring of most Western party 
systems (Carty, 1981: 110; Mair and Weeks 2005, 136).  While social and ideological 
patterns are discernable, they are subtle and ephemeral compared with those in other 
established democracies.  Fianna Fáil is sometimes regarded as the natural party of 
business, but this seems to be because it has also been the natural party of 
government.  The absence of a major ideological difference between the two main 
parties, and indeed any major difference about the role of business in society, or even 
the role of property in the economy, is a reason to doubt that businesses were 
somehow more supportive of Fianna Fáil than donors in general.  Fianna Fáil as the 
“party of business” is much more problematic and mysterious idea than explaining 
business funding of the UK Conservatives, Australian Liberals or US Republicans, as 
all these other parties have a clearly more pro-business tradition and policy profile 
than their main competitors.   
 
The extent to which politicians can provide private goods to donors depends on the 
extent to which public policy is framed in public or private goods and the extent to 
which decisions on private goods are controlled by politicians.  For example, recent 
reports suggest Irish corporate tax policy creates public goods for business (RTÉ, 
2011b), in contrast to the private goods created by the multiple exceptions and 
schemes in France. Even when the state provides private goods, decision-making is 
often well insulated from politics: Enterprise Ireland provides a wide range of private 
goods, but is generally outside political control.  Its sister organization, IDA Ireland, 
is also regarded as impressively independent, but, on occasion, has been unable to 
resist political interference in particular decisions, such as export credit insurance for 
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Goodman International (O’Toole, 1995: 116-133).  The granting of the second mobile 
phone licence was designed to be insulated from politics, but Moriarty argues that 
Michael Lowry managed to interfere in the decision (Moriarty, 2011).  Official 
thinking could clearly go further in moving away from the production of private 
goods, as the recent discussion of a casino licence illustrates. In Ireland, private goods 
can only be delivered via the executive.  In some areas at least, ministers had no 
compunction about using government money to distribute targeted benefits for 
political gain (Suiter and O’Malley, 2011).  The cabinet also dominates the legislative 
process and ministers can target laws to benefit particular interests, as Ray Burke tried 
to do on behalf of Century Radio (Flood 2002a, 62).  Legislators have little or no 
ability to append particularistic benefits to laws.  This is very different to the potential 
for individual legislators to add “earmarks” to bills in the US Congress (Clawson, 
Neustadtl and Weller, 1998, 68-71; Center for Responsive Politics 2011b) or to 
sponsor “leggini” in committees of the Italian legislature (Ginsborg, 2003: 141).  In 
this respect, Ireland is probably rather typical of parliamentary democracies.  
However, even where power is tightly centralised in a cabinet, legislators and 
unelected political actors can act as brokers between donors and key decision-makers, 
as Australian and Canadian experience illustrates.  The term brokerage is central to 
research on constituency service and clientelism in Ireland.  It can also work in the 
opposite direction.  Minister Ray Burke received a large ‘corrupt payment’ to use his 
‘influence’ with local councillors (Flood, 2002a: 75). There is a continuing 
controversy, perhaps underpinned by deliberate political and administrative 
ambiguity, as to whether political brokerage can influence decisions, pretends to 
influence decisions, or merely provides information.  At any rate, there is 
 7 
considerable potential for public representatives to act as brokers for the private goods 
of business donors. 
 
Some areas of public policy and business are harder to deal with in terms of public 
goods than others (Stigler, 1971).  The obvious example is property development, 
which always involves public decisions that can make or break individual firms.  For 
this reason, it is a source of controversy and corruption in virtually every country.  
This has been a major source of scandal in Ireland over recent decades and from 2000 
onwards also accounted for an unusually large proportion of economic activity.  
Political parties, and their elected national representatives, have no direct role in 
planning permission.  Councillors can have a role in passing and amending plans for 
their area and have sold their votes for small amounts of money (McDonagh and 
Black, 2002). In contrast to all categories of elected politician, local authority 
bureaucrats have had the capacity to deliver decisions (Flood 2002b: 5, 19).  For at 
least some TDs, requests for help with commercial planning permission seem to have 
been very common (O’Leary, 2011: 335).  Since TDs have no direct role in planning 
permission, this was also a brokerage service.  In so far as TDs could try to lobby on 
these issues they had to do so very subtly.  For example, in the past, TDs letters could 
be appended to the file sent to a planning inspector to decide on permission.  This 
practice is no longer allowed.  Since developments can have a large effect on local 
economies, TDs may have seen their interventions in the planning process as part of 
their role as “local promoter” (O’Leary, 2011: 337), rather than a favour for donor 
interests.  A controversy has arisen recently over enquiries made by former taoiseach, 
Bertie Ahern, in relation to a planning application made in his constituency by Fianna 
Fáil donors, Ballymore Properties.  The developer and Mr Ahern’s office seemed to 
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suggest that the enquiry was made on behalf of constituents, not the developer (Melia, 
2011).  Nevertheless, requests for help with planning permission were rare compared 
to queries on personal issues such as housing and social welfare (O’Leary, 2011: 
336).  At any rate, Irish businesses could see some potential for obtaining lucrative 
decisions from politicians.  Associations with politics can be costly for some firms 
with sensitive brands or a large consumer market.  Such costs were low for those in 
the property sector and prominent brands have not been among the recent donors to 
Irish parties and politicians.   
 
Publicity costs are obviously much higher for politicians.  In a democracy, votes, not 
euros, should count.  Politicians will want to avoid the perception that they are 
beholden to a particular donor; the perception that they are beholden to a particular 
sector of business; and, indeed, to the business community in general.  The evidence 
on the cost of corruption scandals to Irish politicians is mixed.  Corruption scandals 
do not necessarily destroy a TD’s electability, as the case of Michael Lowry 
spectacularly illustrates.  Charles Haughey thrived as taoiseach in spite of a plethora 
of rumours and a sleazy reputation amongst a large proportion of the electorate.  
However, ministers and taoisigh, like Ray Burke and Bertie Ahern, who are unable to 
rebut specific allegations, find it hard to remain in office.  It is much more difficult to 
assess the cost for parties.  At the very least, it can be observed that Fianna Fáil has 
been Ireland’s most successful political party and the party that has had to endure the 
most corruption scandals.  Like other parties, when necessary, it has been quite 
successful at distinguishing politicians, and even the party leader, from the party 
itself.  However, all these celebrated cases are from the era before disclosure.  Legal 
disclosure increases costs in three different ways: disclosed donations are more public 
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than undisclosed donations; legal evasion of disclosure increases the costs if the 
donations are later discovered; and illegal non-disclosure raises costs yet further.  The 
introduction of disclosure in 2002 increased all such publicity costs for politicians.  
The gradual emergence of widespread access to the internet has increased costs even 
more. 
 
Benoit and Marsh (2008) show that expenditure can increase the chances of election.  
However, the large number of TDs not partaking in fundraising suggests many did not 
accept that expenditure made an important contribution to election campaigns.  In 
contrast to, for example, Australia and the US, Irish politicians cannot buy time on the 
broadcast media, so donations are less beneficial.  Moreover, the importance of local 
issues and small size of electoral quotas mean that a determined individual with a 
small team of helpers can be electorally competitive.  Regulation can reduce the 
benefit of donations, by substituting public funds and by banning or limiting certain 
types of donations.  The international evidence on whether public funding replaces 
donations is rather mixed (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 39; Nassmacher, 2010: 265-269).  
Since 1998 Irish politicians have had access to substantial public funding, which has 
dwarfed reported donations in all years since disclosure of, and limits on, donations 
were introduced in 2002.  Disclosure and limits have reduced the potential for discrete 
exchanges between politicians and business.  In 2002, the threshold for disclosure of 
donations from any one source per annum to a TD was €634.87 and the maximum 
allowable from any one source per annum to a TD was €2,539.48.  There was no limit 
as to how much a TD could receive, but there were limits on campaign expenditure 
ranging from €25,394.76 in a three-seat constituency up to €38,092.14 for a five-
seater.   A similar scheme applied to parties.  The limit for donations from one source 
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in a calendar year was €6348.49 in 2002 and the threshold for reporting annual 
donations was €5,079 in 2006  The parties were subject to limits that they and their 
candidates could spend per candidate during elections.  In 2002, Fianna Fáil was 
limited to €3,428,293 on the general election, Fine Gael €2,755,331 and Labour 
€1,479,245.  All limits are adjusted to the Consumer Price Index and have risen in 
subsequent years.  These regulatory changes have increased the cost, and reduced the 
benefit, of discrete exchanges relative to reciprocal exchanges.  Reciprocal exchanges 
became important in Australia and Canada (until 2004) in the aftermath of disclosure.  
Reciprocal exchange is also important in the US, where there are limits as well as 
disclosure.  Reciprocity was probably the logic behind Fianna Fáil’s Galway Races 
Tent (Ross, 2009: 112-117) and Fine Gael’s golf classics.   It is important to 
remember that TDs and parties face different incentives.  The local focus of their 
campaign means that TDs should receive a lower benefit, but also incur a lower 
publicity cost, from donations. Parties need money to project their party image across 
the country as whole, and the more intense attention of the national media threatens 
higher publicity costs.   
 
Donations: disclosed and undisclosed 
The Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO) has been publishing details of 
donations since 2002.  Table 1 shows donations reported by the three largest parties 
from 2002 to 2009 and the amounts of public funding they received.    For Fianna Fáil 
public funding ranges from 4.4 (in 2002) to 138 times (in 2009).  Fine Gael’s numbers 
range from 15 in 2007 to infinity in 2003 when the party reported no donations.  
Labour’s minimum was 10.6 in 2002 and its maximum was 503 in 2009.  
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
The most obvious feature of this table is the absence of donations to the Fine Gael 
party.  As leader, Michael Noonan announced that the party would no longer accept 
corporate donations.  However, after the disaster of the 2002 election, this decision 
was, somewhat surreptitiously, reversed.  Fine Gael seems to have pursued a policy of 
only accepting donations below the threshold, which was over five thousand euro 
Therefore, the official data on donations to parties is seriously misleading.  The scale 
of this fundraising is not at all clear.  However, in 2010 Fine Gael is supposed to have 
raised €1.2 m from a lottery for ‘members’, which was alleged to have been targeted 
at corporate donors.  If this is correct, business funding must have accounted for a 
considerable portion of the party’s income (O’Farrell, 2011).  The problem of 
unreported donations below the threshold is much less substantial for TDs as the 
threshold is under €650.  While parties may have the resources to concentrate on 
rounding up donations of just over €5,000, individual TDs may not have the time or 
the staff to concentrate on donations of under €600.  Also, the publicity costs for TDs 
are much lower.  The media can follow reported donations relatively assiduously for a 
handful of parties, but there were 166 TDs, many of them with a very low profile 
nationally.  Indeed, all parties reported a greater value of donations to TDs than to 
parties.  This difference in threshold and reporting is a major reason to focus analysis 
on donations to TDs.  Another reason is the greater variation in power.  Parties are 
divided between government and opposition; TDs are divided not just between 
government and opposition, but also between ministers and non-ministers.  Therefore, 
there is greater variation with which to test for pragmatism. The data on donations to 
TDs should be biased against a finding of pragmatism, as larger corporate donations 
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may be made to the parties without disclosure.  However, some media reports suggest 
Fine Gael was particularly cynical in collecting corporate donations below the 
threshold.  This suggests a bias in the figures towards pragmatism as Fine Gael was in 
opposition for the whole period under examination.  These two effects may have 
cancelled each other out. 
 
57 per cent of the TDs that served from 2002 to 2009 reported at least one donation.  
For those reporting donations, the mean annual total was €5,908.1  Fianna Fáil TDs 
raised the most money.  Ivor Callely reported the highest annual total of €69,600; 
followed by Eoin Ryan with €42,950 in 2004; and Martin Cullen with €34,722 in 
2002.  Eoin Ryan was a successful candidate for the European Parliament in 2004 and 
this is surely part of the explanation for the large amount of money he raised in that 
year.  The highest non-Fianna Fáil figure was €24,900 for Jackie Healy Rae in 2004.  
Evidently, some TDs perceived a benefit in raising much more money than could be 
spent during the official election campaign period.   
 
It is much more common for businesses, as opposed to individuals, to donate to 
politicians in order to influence decision-making.  The SIPO returns include a 
classification of the donor.  Those identified as “company”, “businessperson”, or an 
individual with a business address2 have been coded as business donations. 58 per 
cent of those reporting donations also reported at least one business donation.  Eoin 
Ryan’s €31,100 in 2004 was the highest annual total of business donations followed 
by Fianna Fáil colleagues Joe Behan on €30,400 and John McGuinness on €25,700, 
                                                 
1
 This excludes donations from the deputies’ political parties.  Some of these donations may have been 
the result of collections of donations at the constituency level; others seem to be transfers from the 
central party; and several relate to the use of an office. 
2
 However, barristers have been coded as individual donations. 
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both in 2007. Jackie Healy-Rae again leads those outside Fianna Fáil: all of his 
€24,900 in 2005 was attributed to “businessmen”, “builder/contractors” or “hoteliers”.  
It is also possible to code donations related to the property industry by looking at the 
names of companies, either identified as donors or provided as addresses.  Donors 
including the words “property”, “developments”, “construction”, “homes” and 
“auctioneers” were coded as property-related businesses.   Businesses such as 
solicitors and engineering firms were not included.   29 per cent receiving donations 
report at least one donation from the property industry.  Again, the top three come 
from Fianna Fáil.  John McGuinness received €16,500 from such businesses in 2007, 
Bobby Aylward €12,000 also in 2007 and Eoin Ryan got €9,900 in 2004. The highest 
figure outside Fianna Fáil was Jim O’Keeffe’s of Fine Gael: he raised €5,000 from the 
property sector in 2007.  
 
It is possible to infer the motivation of donors from the position of the politician to 
whom they donated and the timing of the donation.  Donations at election time are 
more likely to be ideological, or gestures of political support, rather than an attempt to 
influence a decision.  Donations to members of governing parties are more likely to 
be targeted at gaining some influence.  Given the dominance of the cabinet in Irish 
politics, donations to ministers are particularly likely to be aimed at decision-making.  
The following analyses use these three variables to predict donations to Irish TDs, 
including separate analyses of business and property-related donations.   There are 
separate models for the 2002 to 2007 Dáil and the first three years of the 2007 to 2011 
Dáil.  Each model includes only deputies that served in the relevant Dáil taking 
account of deaths, retirements and by-elections.  Fianna Fáil TDs that lost the party 
whip, but stayed in the national organisation, are coded as Fianna Fáil members.  
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Since the returns are annual, not by Dáil, for deputies that served in both Dáileanna 
the 2007 figures include some money that may have been raised just before or just 
after the relevant term.  There are three different specifications.  First, since most TDs 
did not receive any contribution in an average year, a logit model predicts the logged 
odds that a TD would receive a donation in a given year.  Second, an ordinary least 
squares regression predicts the amount received by each TD in a given year.  The 
amount is logged to reduce the impact of the comparatively large amounts raised by 
some deputies.  Third, there is a Tobit model to account for the “left-censoring” 
caused by the non-reporting of donations below the legal threshold.  The total amount 
of annual donations is also logged for this class of models.  The three different 
techniques produce substantively similar results. 
 
Table 2 shows the estimates for all donations.  TDs are much more likely to receive 
donations in election years, which suggests that, in general, donations are expressions 
of political support intended to help a TD win election.  Membership of governing 
parties or the cabinet are statistically insignificant: donations are not aimed at the 
most powerful. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates for business donations.  This class of donations is also 
much more likely to be received in an election year, although in some of the models 
coefficients are noticeably smaller than for overall donations.  However, the 
coefficients for governing party are two to ten times bigger depending on which pair 
of models is compared.  The governing party coefficients are significant at one per 
cent for the full Dáil term of 2002 to 2007, and five per cent for 2007 to 2009.  The 
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smaller size and lower significance of the coefficients for 2007 to 2009 is hardly 
surprising as this was the period of an extreme economic and political crisis.  Indeed, 
it seems remarkable that the government’s donation bonus is still observable in spite 
of the crisis.  During the 2002 to 2007 term, the dominant governing party, Fianna 
Fáil, was more popular than the opposition and was widely given some of the credit 
for the ongoing economic boom in Ireland.  Perhaps this was acknowledged more by 
business donors than by donors in general.  However, the data are more 
straightforwardly interpretable as an indication that business donors, seeking 
influence, were more attracted by power than other donors.  Nonetheless, the 
coefficients for ministers, the most powerful actors in Irish politics, are even smaller 
than for overall donations: ministers were less likely to receive business donations 
than other TDs from 2007 to 2009.  Perhaps businesses thought it was impossible to 
obtain direct access to ministers and instead sought it through the brokerage of TDs.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Table 4 contains the model for donations from the property sector.  The coefficients 
for election year are similar to those for business donations.  On average, the 
coefficients for governing party are much larger than for business donations, ranging 
from 60 to 230 per cent of their equivalents in Table 2.  All governing party 
coefficients are significant at one per cent for 2002 to 2007; while two are significant 
at five and one at one per cent for 2007 to 2009.  The coefficients for cabinet are 
larger and all in the right direction, but do not approach statistical significance.  It 
appears that property donors were somewhat more attracted by power than other 
business donors.  Although, it is also possible that the models reflect the sector’s 
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support for Fianna Fáil’s “ideologically” pro-development stance, rather than the 
particular interests of the contributing businesses.   
 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The absence of patterns in the identities of the disclosed donors is very striking.  
Regular donations by business were very rare: only four businesses donated on four or 
more of the eight years:  BCR press, Ballycummin Estates, Ladbrokes and McGinley 
Motors, all to Fianna Fáil TDs.  There seem to be only two examples of hedging 
between government and opposition.  In 2007, Treasury Holdings donated to both 
Chris Andrews and Joe Behan of Fianna Fáil as well as Jim O’Keeffe of Fine Gael.3  
In 2002 and 2004, the firm had contributed to only Fianna Fáil.  Also in 2007, 
Waterford Castle Hotel made donations to local TDs, John Deasy of Fine Gael and 
Martin Cullen of Fianna Fáil.  The rarity of regular donations and hedging are 
evidence against reciprocal exchange, or even donations aimed at developing 
reciprocity, in Irish politics.  Corporate donations are small, perhaps too small in cash 
terms for discrete exchanges.  However, they are large in relation to the TDs political 
income and the limits on campaign expenditure  There were sufficiently few donors, 
and their donations were a sufficiently large proportion of TDs’ political funds, for a 
deputy to develop a relationship with a business donor’s management and to attempt 
to (be seen to) intercede with decision-makers.    Some of the TDs report that their 
donations were profits from fundraisers, which were also probably occasions that 
were suitable for the development of reciprocity.  Moreover, it should be remembered 
that Dublin City councillors sold their votes for comparably small amounts in the 
                                                 
3
 This assumes that the Spencer Dock Development Company, part-owned by Treasury, represented the 
same interest. 
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early 1990s.  Since Fianna Fáil was in government throughout this period, it is 
difficult to rule out their dominance of donations to TDs was a reflection of support 
for, and the popularity of, the Fianna Fáil party.  Nonetheless, as already argued, this 
interpretation seems strange given the similarity of the two major parties in Ireland. 
 
Disclosed and undisclosed donations suggest that business pragmatism in business 
financing of Irish politics continues.  Business donations to TDs show a clear bias 
towards the governing party; property donations exhibit an even stronger bias.  The 
legal evasion of disclosure of corporate donations to the parties may reflect public 
misunderstandings of the social and ideological motivations behind business 
financing of parties.  However, it is also likely to be intended to offer businesses a 
greater potential benefit from political decisions than would be possible if donations 
were fully disclosed.  The next section considers recent reform proposals in the light 
of the preceding analysis. 
 
 
Reform  
 
The Moriarty Tribunal’s remit included recommendations on the regulation of 
political donations.  Its suggestions seem to be inspired by both the events it 
investigated and the law in other jurisdictions.  The major recommendations were as 
follows: 
 
1. All income, not just donations, should be disclosed.  In many countries, parties 
must publish annual accounts.  It is, however, unusual to require details of all income.  
In Australia, all payments received by a party above a threshold must be reported.  
Parties often classify income from fundraising events as commercial income, rather 
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than political donations, thereby hoping to evade disclosure.  Requiring the reporting 
of all payments alleviates this problem.  In Australia, parties must classify all income 
as ‘donations’ or ‘other payments’.  The legal distinction is subtle in practice and the 
Australian Electoral Commission does not have the resources to contest dubious 
classifications.  Nonetheless, citizens and researchers can make their own guesses as 
to the motivation behind reported payments. 
 
2. The ‘gross amount of a donation should determine its disclosability, so that, for 
instance, where tables at dinners or similar functions are paid for by way of political 
donation, the total contribution, and not the value thereof after deducting the cost of 
the relevant function, should be disclosed’ (Moriarty, 2011: 1158).  This is another 
recommendation that addresses how fundraising techniques create opportunities to 
engage in evasive accounting.  The TDs’ returns contain many small payments 
described as profits from fundraisers.  It is very tempting to inflate the cost of a 
chicken dinner, game of golf, or the administration of a lottery.   
 
3. Loans should be disclosed.4 This is also an area where accounting treatment can 
serve to evade disclosure.  British political parties classified large donations as loans 
to avoid disclosure.  When discovered, some loans were reclassified as donations, as 
neither the donor nor the donee ever intended the money to be paid back, and indeed 
the donee would have found it difficult to do so (Doward and Syal, 2008).  In Britain, 
loans, and crucially the attached interest rate, now have to be disclosed.  A large loan-
qua-donation can potentially give a donor much more leverage over a politician or 
party than a normal donation.  Allied Irish Banks did not press Charles Haughey to 
                                                 
4
 The Tribunal’s language is confusing on this issue, but, at a minimum, it advocates the publication of 
some loans, and, at a maximum, all loans (Moriarty 2011, 1158). 
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repay his debts.  Claims about loans to politicians have recently resurfaced in Irish 
politics (Oliver, 2011; RTÉ, 2011b).  Irish politics is not particularly capital-intensive.  
Therefore, personal liabilities may be relatively more important than party liabilities 
in Ireland than in some other jurisdictions. 
 
4. Voluntary auditing of officeholders. This is the equivalent of parties publishing 
their annual accounts.  It makes sense in the context of the great power of individual 
cabinet ministers and the importance of individual candidates in Irish electoral 
competition.  However, it lists only Ministers, Ministers of State, and the chairs and 
deputy chairs of the two houses of the Oireachtas.  Thus, it is not a check on the role 
of brokerage in business lobbying.   
 
5. Disclosure of interest, or even potential interest, in government contracts.  This 
suggestion is aimed at the most obvious private good that government can supply.  Of 
course, there are many other benefits that can be targeted at donors.   
 
6. Instant disclosure.  The internet means there is virtually no practical objection to 
this proposal.  In Britain, disclosure is now very close to real time during general 
elections. 
 
The first three of these recommendations aim at full disclosure of payments, thus 
remedying the most obvious flaw in the current legislation and practice.  The fourth 
and fifth seem very ambitious in laying bare actual and potential financial interests in 
political decisions.  Ireland’s politicians have reacted decisively, but have made a 
different diagnosis and offered a different prescription.  For Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil 
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and Labour, the problem is the source of donations, rather than an absence of 
transparency.  Fianna Fáil presented a bill to end corporate donations (Dáil Debate 10 
May, 2011, Electoral (Amendment) (Political Donations) Bill 2011). A government 
bill, probably fearing a constitutional challenge to an outright ban, proposes 
procedures that restrict corporate donations to €200 unless the donor provides SIPO 
with: 
• the name and address of the person or persons responsible for the 
organisation, management or financial affairs of the body; 
• a statement of the nature and purpose of the body; 
• a list of the membership or shareholders of the body;  
• a copy of its statement of accounts for that year, and; 
• a copy of the annual report to its members; 
  and, 
• the donor has declared to the recipient that the donation has been 
authorised by a general meeting of the members of the body concerned 
(Electoral (Amendment) (Political Funding) Bill 2011, General 
Scheme, 2.1). 
 
The clear intention is to marginalise funding from business corporations, while still 
allowing trade unions and public interest groups a role in financing Irish politics.  The 
bill also reduces the thresholds for accepting and disclosing donations.  The maximum 
donation to a party is reduced to €2,500 from €6,348.69 and the maximum to 
individuals is reduced to €1,000 from €2,539.48.  The threshold for disclosure of 
donations to parties comes down to €1,500 from €5,078.95 and that for individuals 
comes down to €600 from €634.87.  The bill does introduce a requirement for the 
parties to publish audited annual accounts.  However, it does not stipulate what detail 
is to be provided, instead asking SIPO, after consulting with political parties, to 
produce guidelines (Electoral (Amendment) (Political Funding) Bill 2011, Head 28).  
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It would be difficult for an administrative body like SIPO to suggest the reporting of 
specific loans, or specific sources of non-donation income, if the political parties 
resist doing so.  The bill seems to envisage a very general profit and loss account and 
balance sheet as is common in many jurisdictions.  The bill also provides for changes 
to provisions for the funding of local and presidential elections and introduces gender 
quotas as a condition for receiving full public funding.   
 
The bill’s aggressive attack on corporate donations is much more radical than the 
Moriarty recommendations, and is a clever way of trying to avoid possible 
constitutional problems with a straightforward ban.  Together with the reduction in 
thresholds, it should reduce the considerable scope for reciprocal exchange between 
Irish politics and business that currently exists.  However, it leaves open the 
possibility of political contributions described as “commercial payments”, 
undervalued profits from fundraisers, or loans to politicians and parties.  An annual 
statement of accounts, while very welcome, does not necessarily detail specific 
payments or liabilities and therefore does not address this problem.  Indeed, pseudo-
commercial payments and pseudo-loans could easily be large enough to form the 
basis of discrete exchanges.   It is virtually impossible to eliminate the potential for 
reciprocal exchange from the political system, as it only requires small amounts of 
money per annum.  Moreover, business interests can be furthered through individual 
payments.  The giant Telenor donation to Fine Gael reached the party disguised as a 
donation by Fine Gael activist David Austin.  The TDs’ donation returns contain some 
of the names of Ireland’s most prominent developers.  Although legally individual 
some of these payments may have served business interests.  Donations by wealthy 
businesspeople are common in other jurisdictions.  Often, they are ideological 
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payments, aimed at furthering the donor’s political values, rather than their business 
interests, but the latter is possible, especially when direct corporate donations are 
difficult.  The small-scale of Irish society and the family nature of many businesses 
suggest that this phenomenon is potentially more dangerous in Ireland than in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
Once politicians agree, transparency regulations are quite easy to implement.  It is 
much more difficult to implement changes to political decision-making such that 
politicians cannot distribute private goods to donors.  Nonetheless, this is also 
essential to restrict unhealthy exchanges between donors and politicians in the future.   
  It is both commonplace and correct to advocate greater transparency in executive 
decision-making and greater legislative oversight would help (Barry, 2011; OECD, 
2011).  However, another change is to shift away from private goods and towards 
public goods. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has concentrated on potential exchanges between businesses and 
politicians in Irish politics.  By doing so, it has taken a new angle on issues previously 
studied from the vantage point of corruption, and to a lesser extent, social partnership, 
industrial policy and the regulation of lobbying.  The forthcoming drastic restriction 
of corporate donations may eliminate the possibility of further such studies in the 
future.  However, studies of individual donors have been undertaken outside Ireland 
and much can be learnt from their social, political and economic backgrounds.  
Moreover, studies of firms making commercial payments or loans to Irish parties and 
politicians would also be very valuable, if such information is made available. 
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This study has concluded that there has been considerable scope for the exchange of 
brokerage services in reciprocation for small disclosed donations.  It is also possible 
that there has been discrete exchange of private goods for undisclosed donations or 
loans from businesses or businesspeople.  This is evident from the statistical 
association between disclosed donations to TDs and Fianna Fáil, anecdotes about 
undisclosed donations and the insights generated by the tribunals of inquiry.  The 
fundraising techniques of Irish parties and TDs are remarkably similar to those of 
other English-speaking jurisdictions.  However, the small scale of Irish society, the 
candidate-centred electoral competition, the TD’s tradition of constituency service, 
and the dominance of the executive all point towards a particular importance for 
individual relationships and brokerage.   
 
The marginalisation of corporate donations would reduce the scope for both 
reciprocal and discrete exchange.  However, reform should go further by demanding 
the enumeration of both commercial payments and loans.  Both of these have greater 
potential to warp politics and the economy than relatively small, disclosed corporate 
donations.  Moreover, the potential for business cash to infiltrate politics cannot be 
eliminated as legally individual donations may be proxies for business interests.  In an 
Irish context, the intertwining of personal relationships, business, and politics is 
perhaps more likely than elsewhere.   
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Table 1. Donations and public funding 
 Fianna Fáil Fine Gael Labour 
Donations Donations Donations 
 
TDs Party 
Public 
Funding TDs Party 
Public 
Funding TDs Party 
Public 
Funding 
2002 239170 193539 1898164 17695 0 1193566 40800 18314 627385 
2003 14539 8579 1972279 0 0 1126877 3560 6349 606324 
2004 91307 43572 2049876 6100 0 1168924 3920 0 626481 
2005 114361 76498 2124237 1000 0 1209218 3740 0 645799 
2006 83937 0 2199254 3200 0 1249867 4850 11100 665286 
2007 412391 19044 2244024 93382 0 1420551 40660 18648 656468 
2008 37457 11800 2284872 19450 0 1545630 2320 0 652704 
2009 16800 0 2329418 5750 0 1574916 1320 0 663557 
Note: The source is the Standards in Public Office Commission. 
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Table 2. All donations 
 
 2002-2007 2007-2009 
 Logit OLS Tobit Logit OLS Tobit 
Election 2.07 (0.22)** 
2.7 
(0.26)** 
11.73 
(1.05)** 
2.31 
(0.25)** 
3.24 
(0.32)** 
13.27 
(1.1)** 
Governing party 0.15 (0.26) 
0.29 
(0.27) 
1.46 
(1.45) 
0.2 
(0.32) 
0.36 
(0.33) 
1.65 
(1.73) 
Cabinet 0.23 (0.51) 
0.27 
(0.64) 
1.24 
(2.83) 
0.24 
(0.52) 
0.2 
(0.62) 
.98 
(2.8) 
Constant -2.51 (0.24)** 
0.5 
(0.16)** 
-14.53 
(1.49)** 
-2.66 
(0.29)** 
0.35 
(0.19) 
-15.15 
(1.75)** 
Wald / F 89.35** 37.72** 43.96** 85.9** 33.78** 49.46** 
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.155 0.159 0.073 0.187 0.212 0.094 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -408 - -969 -203 - -489 
Observations 982 982 982 505 505 505 
Teachtaí Dála 168 168 168 169 169 169 
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by TD, are presented in parentheses. 
 
 29 
 
 
Table 3. Business donations 
 
 2002-2007 2007-2009 
 Logit OLS Tobit Logit OLS Tobit 
Election 1.41 (0.26)** 
1.09 
(0.2)** 
9.44 
(1.6)** 
1.98 
(0.31)** 
1.83 
(0.28)** 
13.19 
(1.63)** 
Governing party 1.51 (0.34)** 
0.96 
(0.22)** 
9.95 
(1.99)** 
0.88 
(0.38)* 
0.73 
(0.28)* 
6.03 
(2.46)* 
Cabinet 0.04 (0.55) 
0.08 
(0.58) 
.52 
(3.78) 
-0.17 
(0.64) 
-0.14 
(0.6) 
-0.42 
(4.2) 
Constant -3.83 (0.32)** 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-26.83 
(2.2)** 
-3.52 
(0.4)** 
-.012 
(0.15) 
-24.31 
(2.62) 
Wald / F 61.5** 16.2** 27.54** 44.96** 15.53** 24.32** 
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.124 0.083 0.067 0.145 0.12 0.815 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -283 - -580 -155 - -325 
Observations 982 982 982 505 505 505 
Teachtaí Dála 168 168 168 169 169 169 
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by TD, are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Property donations 
 
 2002-2007 2007-2009 
 Logit OLS Tobit Logit OLS Tobit 
Election 1.5 (0.39)** 
1.09 
(0.2)** 
10.48 
(2.41)** 
2.87 
(0.62)** 
0.99 
(0.21)** 
18.76 
(3.08)** 
Governing party 3.5 (1.02)** 
0.96 
(0.22)** 
20.57 
(4.72)** 
1.2 
(0.52)* 
0.44 
(0.16)** 
8.6 
(3.39)* 
Cabinet 0.47 (0.44) 
0.08 
(0.58) 
3.53 
(3.16) 
0.11 
(0.61) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
0.28 
(3.98) 
Constant -6.9 (1.01)** 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-47.67 
(4.79)** 
-5.52 
(0.8)** 
-0.18 
(0.08)* 
-38.61 
(4.33)** 
Wald / F 34.35** 16.2** 18.9** 22.22** 7.78** 12.96** 
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.189 0.083 0.114 0.21 0.095 0.142 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -127 - -237 -78 - -144 
Observations 982 982 982 505 505 505 
Teachtaí Dála 168 168 168 169 169 169 
*P<0.05, **P<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered by TD, are presented in parentheses. 
 
 
 
